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IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE PACIFIC THROUGH NATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF FIJI1 
Catherine Renshaw, Andrew Byrnes and Andrea Durbach* 
This article discusses the experience of the Fijian Human Rights Commission as an illustration of 
some of the challenges Pacific nations may face in achieving an independent and effective human 
rights institution in a complex and sometimes volatile socio-political context.  The article argues 
that the presence of a supportive regional network of national human rights institutions is essential 
to creating and maintaining independent and effective national institutions.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the Governments of a number of the larger Pacific island nations have stated that 
they wish to create national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights.2 National 
  
1  The research which this article is based on forms part of the Australian Research Council Linkage Project 
LP0776639 (with the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions). For further details, see 
www.ahrcentre.org/. The authors are grateful to Kieren Fitzpatrick and Pip Dargan of the Asia Pacific 
Forum of National Human Rights Institutions [APF] who provided the authors with access to APF archives 
during the course of their research. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the valuable contribution of the 
referee, whose many helpful suggestions have been incorporated in the final version of this article. 
*  Catherine Renshaw is a research fellow with the Australian Human Rights Centre at the University of New 
South Wales. Andrew Byrnes is Professor of International Law and Chair of the Management Committee of 
the Australian Human Rights Centre at the University of New South Wales. Andrea Durbach is Associate 
Professor and Director of the Australian Human Rights Centre at the University of New South Wales. 
2  Examples include: Papua New Guinea Secretary for Community Development Joseph Klapat "Final Option 
Paper for a Human Rights Commission" The Marianas (17 December 2007) www.mvariety.com (accessed 
21 August 2008); the Attorney-General for Samoa undertook to explore the establishment of a national 
human rights commission in the near future (Strategies for the Future: Protecting Rights in the Pacific 
Conference, Apia, Samoa, 27-29 April 2008); in 2005 Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza made a statement 
detailing plans for the establishment of a NHRI with the assistance of the APF; "NHRI Forum" Solomon 
Star Newspaper (24 February 2005). The Solomon Islands Government sent delegates to the first annual 
meeting of the APF in Darwin in 1996. 
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human rights institutions (NHRIs) are independent bodies established by constitutional or legislative 
provisions, with a mandate to ensure that states act to protect and take steps to promote a broad 
range of human rights. The global momentum towards the establishment of NHRIs has until now 
largely bypassed the Pacific, with the exception of Fiji. 
The potential benefits of embedding a dedicated human rights institution within the state are 
many. In the context of the Pacific, three benefits may be of particular significance. First, members 
of a national institution are able to work closely with Government in implementing strategies to 
realise human rights. Secondly, members of the human rights institution are acutely aware of the 
socio-cultural context into which the panoply of human rights must be translated. Thirdly, there is a 
sense of ownership in the human rights institution and the principles it embodies by civil society. In 
a region such as the Pacific, geographic separation with disparate cultures, languages and traditions, 
these factors have the potential to contribute to a national institution that could effectively, 
inclusively and gradually inform the human rights culture of a Pacific nation's government and 
executive.  
This article discusses the experience of the Fijian Human Rights Commission (FHRC) as 
illustrative of some of the challenges Pacific nations may face in achieving an independent and 
effective human rights institution in a complex and sometimes volatile socio-political context. It 
argues that the presence of a supportive regional network of national human rights institutions is 
essential to creating and maintaining independent and effective national institutions. This article 
considers the FHRC's decision to withdraw its membership from its regional association, the Asia 
Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF), and from the corresponding 
international network, the United Nations International Coordinating Committee of Institutions for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (ICC), in the wake of the 2006 assumption of 
military control by Commodore Frank Bainimarama. It considers the factors that led to the APF and 
ICC questioning the independence of the Fijian Human Rights Commission after the events of 2006 
and in this context offers suggestions about ways in which the construction of a national 
commission (its mandate and composition) might assist in preserving the institution's independence.  
II THE PARIS PRINCIPLES AND THE ASIA PACIFIC FORUM OF 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS  
The burgeoning of NHRIs since the early 1990s has seen the emergence of international and 
regional networks of national institutions established to support the work of individual institutions 
through collective action and the sharing of expertise among network members. The most developed 
and active of these networks has been the APF. The APF is a regional network of NHRIs whose 
members largely comply, or are in the process of becoming compliant, with the Paris Principles.3 
  
3  Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion 
of Human Rights UNGA Res 48/134 (20 December 1993) [Paris Principles].  
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The Paris Principles are a set of minimum criteria endorsed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, designed to ensure the independence, effectiveness and pluralistic basis of NHRIs. The 
APF supports the establishment of new NHRIs in the region and assists in building capacity within 
existing NHRIs.  Future NHRIs established in the Pacific region – such as those foreshadowed in 
the nations of Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea, for example – would be eligible to 
apply for membership of the APF.  
The APF acts as a transnational "network" of the sort described by Anne-Marie Slaughter as "a 
pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across borders."4 
Since its inception in 1996, the APF – whose members include seventeen countries spread 
geographically from Jordan to Timor-Leste – has convened annually so that its members can 
consider human rights issues of concern and develop joint solutions to common problems. The 
network facilitates the exchange of information between members, forges links between staff in 
different national institutions, and disseminates technological expertise.  The APF's achievements 
are the result of two central network features: the application of a criteria for membership that 
adheres to international standards and the network's effective operation as a conduit of information.   
The criteria for full membership of the APF are adherence to the Paris Principles, which provide 
that:5 
A national institution should be given as broad a mandate as possible based on universal human rights 
standards; 
The institution should be established in a constitutional or legislative text; 
The composition of the institution should ensure pluralist representation of society; and 
A national institution should have adequate funding to ensure its independence from government. 
In the decade or so since its inception, the APF has applied these criteria with a degree of rigour. 
National institutions that do not comply with the Paris Principles, but which are likely to do so 
within a relatively short period of time, can become "candidate members" of the APF, while the 
national institution's members and the state's legislators make the changes needed for the institution 
to become compliant with the Paris Principles. Associate members are those institutions which 
currently do not comply with the Paris Principles and are unlikely to do so within a reasonable 
  
4  Anne-Marie Slaughter A New World Order (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004) 14. 
5  Paris Principles, above n 3.  
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period.6 The Paris Principles are also the criteria used by the ICC when it accords status to national 
human rights institutions.7  
The APF's operation as a conduit of information is particularly important in the Asia Pacific 
region, where many of the NHRIs function with limited resources and in situations where the 
independence of the national institution may be susceptible to political interference. Through the 
APF, members are provided with access to information about best practices and operational 
efficiencies of other NHRIs in the region. Members are also provided with information about others' 
competence, integrity and independence. The desire of members to uphold their reputation within 
the network has led, over time, to the adoption of internal procedures and practices that conform 
with the expectations of their professional peers.8  
Many of the challenges faced by Pacific nations, for example: climate change, migrant 
populations, and the fracturing of cultural links between individuals and societies, are the results of 
globalisation. Although the dimensions of these challenges are global, in many senses national 
institutions, not global ones, are well placed to measure and respond to many of the human rights 
implications of these challenges. National institutions are staffed by the nation's citizens and steeped 
in the nation's culture and history. Nonetheless, in order to respond to regional and global problems 
such institutions must be linked – they must be able to share information across borders, to 
disseminate ideas and address common concerns while still maintaining their national identities. A 
network, such as APF, provides an answer to the "globalisation paradox": "[p]eople and their 
governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be 
addressed on a global scale ... yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable".9 Nascent 
NHRIs in the Pacific region will benefit greatly from engagement with their regional network of 
NHRIs, the APF, as it enhances the capacity of individual institutions, shares best practices amongst 
institutions and facilitates co-operation between national institutions.  
  
6  Andrew Byrnes, Andrea Durbach and Catherine Renshaw "Joining the Club: the Asia Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions, the Paris Principles and the advancement of human rights protection in 
the region" (2008) 14(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 63; [2008] UNSWLRS 39. 
7  The ICC has three categories of membership: 'A' (an institution is compliant with the Paris Principles); 'B' 
(an institution is not fully compliant with the Paris Principles, but has the status of "observer"); or 'C' (an 
institution is not compliant with the Paris Principles). Only 'A' status national institutions have the right to 
appear before the UN Human Rights Council. 
8  Kal Raustiala's discussion of co-operation between network members to achieve positive common outcomes 
and the increased tendency to conform to common norms over a period of time is helpful in analysing the 
work of networks such as APF: Kal Raustiala "The Architecture of International Co-operation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law" (2002-3) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of 
International Law 1. 
9  Slaughter, above n 4, 8. 
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The manner in which the FHRC was established (under the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of 
Fiji),10 its mandate and the selection process for Commissioners, were deemed by the APF and the 
ICC to accord with the Paris Principles at the inception of the FHRC in 1999. The FHRC was 
admitted as a full member of the APF in 2000 and received accreditation with the ICC that same 
year. In the period 2000-2007, the FHRC appears to have been an engaged and active member of its 
regional network and to have participated fully in the ICC. In 2005, the FHRC represented the APF 
on the accreditation subcommittee of the ICC. In 2006, the FHRC hosted the eleventh Annual 
Meeting of the APF in Suva, Fiji.  
This article explores the experience of the FHRC and the circumstances which led to 
questioning by the APF and the ICC of the Commission's continued adherence to the Paris 
Principles in the turbulent period following the assumption of power by the military in December 
2006. 
III THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS OF THE FIJI HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMMISSION  
The FHRC was established under section 42 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji 
Islands. Section 42 of the Constitution established the Human Rights Commission and conferred on 
it three primary functions: to educate the public about the nature and content of the Fiji Bill of 
Rights, to make recommendations to the Government about matters affecting compliance with 
human rights and to perform such other functions as are conferred on it by a law made by the 
Parliament. 
Section 42(3) of the Constitution provides that the Human Rights Commission is to consist of 
three members. The Ombudsman is ex officio one of these members and serves as chairperson of 
the Commission. The other members of the Human Rights Commission are appointed by the 
President on the advice of the Prime Minister, following consultation by the Prime Minister with the 
leader of the Opposition and the sector standing committee of the House of Representatives 
responsible for matters concerning human rights.11 Section 163 of the Constitution provides that the 
Ombudsman is appointed by the Constitutional Offices Commission following consultation by the 
Prime Minister.12 The Constitutional Offices Commission, consisting of a chairperson and two 
other  
 
  
10  Discussed within this paper at Part III, below. 
11  1997 Constitution of Republic of the Fiji Islands, s 42(4) [the Constitution]. 
12  Ibid, s 163(1). 
256 (2009) 40 VUWLR 
members,13 is appointed by the President on the nomination of the Minister.14 The term of 
appointment of the Ombudsman (and hence Chairperson of the FHRC) is five years, and he or she is 
eligible for reappointment. Other members of the Human Rights Commission hold office for two 
years and are eligible for reappointment for one further term of two years.15  
Fijian historian Brij Lal, who served as a member of the Constitutional Review Commission 
(CRC) leading to the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, writes that the adoption of that Constitution 
"was preceded by the most comprehensive process of review and consultation ever carried out in 
Fiji."16 The CRC was appointed by Parliament, which also drew up the CRC's Terms of 
Reference:17  
To produce a report recommending constitutional arrangements which would meet the present and 
future needs of the people of Fiji; promote racial harmony, national unity and the economic and social 
advancement of all communities, while at the same time taking into account internationally recognised 
principles and standards of individual and group rights, guaranteeing full protection and promotion of 
the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous Fijian and Rotuman people, and having full regard 
for the rights, interests and concerns of all ethnic groups in Fiji. 
The CRC's Report formed the basis of the 1997 Constitution of Fiji, which was unanimously 
approved by Parliament and blessed by the Bose Levi Vakaturaga,18 or Great Council of Chiefs. 
The new Constitution received support from all major parties and from civil society.19 Like its 
predecessors, the 1970 and 1990 constitutions, the 1997 Constitution included a Bill of Rights in the 
form typical of the one included, with some variations, in the constitutions of most former British 
colonies in the Pacific and elsewhere.20  
  
13  Ibid, s 143(1). 
14  Each nomination must be approved by the appropriate sector standing committee of the House of 
Representatives before the Minister submits the nomination to the President. The sector standing committee 
may confirm or reject a nomination made by the Minister, in which case the Minister may make a fresh 
nomination; ibid, ss 143(4)-143(6). 
15  Ibid, ss 170(1) and 170(2). 
16  Brij V Lal "Making History, Becoming History: Reflections on the Alleged Failure of the Fiji Constitution" 
(2001) 5 Newcastle Law Review 82. 
17  Ibid, 85. 
18  "The Great Council of Chiefs" established under s 116 of the Constitution. 
19  Lal, above n 16, 85-86. 
20  This Bill of Rights was based on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222, which was itself based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 and it protected primarily 
civil and political rights.  
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The CRC anticipated that a NHRI would make a significant contribution to achieving the inter-
racial harmony and consequent political stability that Fiji hoped to attain after the introduction of the 
1997 Constitution.21 The CRC held the view that a Human Rights Commission could address "the 
limited public awareness of the Bills of Rights in the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions, as well as the 
lack of in-depth understanding about the work of United Nations bodies in promoting human 
rights".22 The CRC argued that:23  
Respect for the Bill of Rights required understanding of its provisions and their origins in the 
international instruments, as well as understanding and acceptance of the promotional and supervisory 
role of United Nations bodies and their member states in the international protection of human rights. 
The CRC viewed the primary role of a Human Rights Commission to be "in the first instance 
public education" and then "an advisory function in alerting the government to matters affecting 
compliance with human rights norms".24 It considered that the proposed Human Rights 
Commission "could also be given the function of making recommendations on the implications of 
any proposed Act or regulations or other policy of the Government that the Commission considers 
may affect human rights".25 With extraordinary prescience, in light of events after December 2006, 
the CRC advised that:26 
 
This is a role that needs to be exercised with extreme caution. Opinions may legitimately differ on 
whether proposed way of dealing with a recognised evil is or is not consistent with human rights. That 
question is properly a matter for public debate. But a body devoted to the protection of human rights 
should express its concerns only after undertaking adequate research and seeking to ensure that its 
recommendations will achieve a proper balance between human rights principles and the problem that 
the government is trying to address. Otherwise its efforts could be counterproductive. 
The Fijian Parliament passed the Human Rights Commission Act 1999 ("the Act") to give effect 
to the provisions of the Constitution establishing the Commission. The Act established a human 
rights commission with a broad range of powers and duties, including the central functions of 
providing education about human rights, conducting inquiries and investigations into possible 
 
21  For background on previous military coups see Victor Lal Fiji Coups in Paradise (Zed Books, London, 
1990) and Brij Lal and Tomasi Vakatora Fiji in Transition (University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1997).  
22  Sir Paul Reeves, Tomasi Rayulu Vakatora and Brioj Vilash Lal The Fiji Islands - Towards a United Future: 
Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission Parliament of Fiji (Parliamentary Paper No 34, 1996) 
125. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
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infringements of human rights, encouraging governmental compliance with Fiji's international 
human rights obligations, advising Government of the human rights implications of its actions and 
policies and resolving complaints by conciliation or by referral to the courts.27  
In relation to the selection of Commissioners, the Act addresses the Paris Principles 
requirements of pluralism in section 8. This section provides that regard must be had not only to the 
personal attributes of members, but also to the desirability of members possessing a diverse range of 
characteristics such as race, ethnic origin, colour, place of origin, gender, sexual orientation, birth, 
primary language, economic status, age and disability.28 Section 10(1) of the Human Rights Act 
provides that a Commissioner must not actively engage in politics. 
IV THE FIFI HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 1999-2006  
The Director of the FHRC in 2006 was Dr Shaista Shameem, who had held the position since 
1999.29 Dr Shameem stated "at its inception in 1999, the FHRC concentrated on its education 
function, publishing pamphlets and conducting workshops and training for trainers and human rights 
activists as well as police and prison authorities".30 After George Speight's abortive coup in 2000 
and the state of emergency that followed, the FHRC continued its work amidst budget cuts and 
security issues.31 However, the FHRC continued to function, focussing its attention on 
  
27  Human Rights Commission Act 1999, s 7. 
28  Human Rights Commission Act 1999, s 8 provides: 
In advising the President as to the persons to be appointed as members of the Commission pursuant to 
section 42 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister must have regard not only to their personal attributes 
but also to- 
their knowledge or experience of the different aspects of matters likely to come before the 
Commission; and 
the desirability of having as members of the Commission persons with a diversity of the personal 
characteristics referred to in subsection 38 (2) of the Constitution. 
Section 38(2) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination against any person on the ground of his or her  
Actual or supposed personal characteristics, including race, ethnic origin, colour, place of origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, birth, primary language, economic status, age or disability" or 
opinions or beliefs, except to the extent that those opinions or beliefs involve harm to others or the 
diminution of the rights or freedoms of others. 
29  The FHRC has a full-time Director who oversees the Commission's operations. Dr Shaista Shameem was 
appointed Director of the FHRC in 1999 and now holds the position of Chairperson; the appointment is 
referred to in the Fiji Human Rights Commission's publication 6 (3) Rights Quarterly (September 2007). 
30  Shaista Shameem The Fiji Human Rights Commission (Osaka, Hurights, 2001) www.hurights.or.jp 
(accessed 6 August 2008).  
31  Ibid. 
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"investigating allegations of human rights violations and breaches of the Bill of Rights by the police, 
military and prison authorities during the state of emergency".32 Dr Shameem stated in 2001 that:33 
The Commission's close association with the Asia Pacific Forum for National Human Rights Institutions 
assists it in keeping in mind international human rights law as well as fosters the human rights practice 
in Fiji that is specific to our own special circumstance as a Pacific Island State with a unique multi-
ethnic culture. 
By 2002, Dr Shameem was able to claim that "the Commission had dealt with just about every 
single right protected in Chapter Four of the Constitution".34 Notable amongst its achievements was 
successfully arguing that the sentence of the convicted leader of the May 2000 civilian coup, George 
Speight, should be commuted from the death penalty to life imprisonment. The FHRC was also 
successful in lobbying Parliament to have the death penalty removed from the penal code.35 
The FHRC appears to have been energetic in fulfilling its mandate to protect and promote 
human rights at the domestic level. In 2006 the FHRC Complaints Unit reported dealing with 
twenty-two cases concerning human rights issues such as the right to legal counsel, the right to 
equality on the ground of sexual orientation; cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment by police 
officers; and constitutional redress applications by prisoners who complained about their conditions 
in prison and holding cells.36 In its 2006 Report to the APF, the FHRC detailed a programme of 
public education that included developing a human rights intervention curriculum for schools from 
pre-school to Form Seven, community education programmes and community consultations.37 The 
FHRC reported receiving requests from the Government and Parliamentary select committees for 
submissions on several Bills, such as the Prisons and Corrections Bill, Financial Management Bill, 
Employment Relations Bill and the Reconciliation and Unity Bill. The FHRC reported that:38  
  
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Shaista Shameem "The Challenge for a Genuinely Free Press in the Pacific" (2002) Pacific Journalism 
Online www.usp.ac.fj/ (accessed 6 August 2008). 
35  Country Report of Fiji Delivered at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National 
Human Rights Institutions (Delhi, India, 13 November 2002). An overview of the protection function of the 
FHRC, written by Dr Shameem, is provided in Bertrand G Ramcharan (ed) The Protection Role of National 
Human Rights Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 2005) 43-56. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Fiji Human Rights Commission Fiji Human Rights Commission Annual Report to APF (2006). 
38  Ibid. 
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These bills were revised quite substantially subsequent to our submissions and we have agreed with the 
recommendations of the select subcommittees for their amendments in compliance with the Bill of 
Rights provisions in our Constitution. 
By 2006, the FHRC had established its credentials as an independent and effective human rights 
commission.  
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the FHRC's work before the assumption of military 
power by Commander Bainimarama in December 2006, was the Commission's June 2006 Report on 
Government's Affirmative Action Programmes, 2020 Plan for Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans and 
the Blueprint. In this report, the FHRC concluded that the Government of Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase had breached provisions of the 1997 Constitution, which guarantees freedom from unfair 
discrimination39 and requires that affirmative action programmes be designed to achieve effective 
equality of access to "all groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged".40 The FHRC 
argued that the steps taken by the Government to address the poverty of indigenous Fijians (which 
included granting Government contracts to indigenous Fijians and restricting Indo-Fijians from 
Government-sponsored business opportunities),41 "failed to make provision for all who are 
disadvantaged".42 The Commission's Report drew particular attention to the fact that the 
Government programmes failed to make provisions in relation to women, who suffered greater 
disadvantage that men and stated that "[i]ndividual programmes are weighed so disproportionately 
against Indians, women and other disadvantaged groups as to undermine the legality of all the 
programmes based on ethnicity."43 Commentators such as Kevin Chang have supported the FHRC's 
indictment of the Government's affirmative action plans, arguing, "one core problem of the 
affirmative action program lay in its simplistic connection between poverty and ethnicity and its 
implication that all indigenous Fijians are disadvantaged".44 
In a press conference held on 30 June 2006 in order to respond to the FHRC Report, Prime 
Minister Qarase stated, "the Commission has not properly discharged its responsibilities, and has 
  
39  The Constitution (Fiji), s 38(2). 
40  Ibid, s 44(1). 
41  Kevin Chang "After the Storm of 2000: Fiji's Troubled Path Toward Justice and Reconciliation" in Wilmar 
Salim and Kiran Sagoo (eds) Sustaining a Resilient Asia-Pacific Community (East-West Centre and 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008) 119, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136486 (accessed 1 June 
2008).  
42  Fiji Human Rights Commission Report on Government's Affirmative Action Programmes, 2020 Plan for 
Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans and the Blueprint (2006) 4. 
43  Ibid, 4. 
44  Chang, above n 41, 16. 
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sowed seeds of division at a time when we are trying to build harmony and unity in the nation."45 
The Prime Minister affirmed the Government's commitment to helping the disadvantaged of all 
communities, stating:46 
Affirmative action is central to our mission of creating a stable and harmonious country. Virtual 
exclusion of Fijians from major sectors of the economy was a big factor in what occurred in 1987 and 
2000. We do not want that to happen again. That is why we are determined to remove long-standing 
disparities in society and the economy, defined largely on ethnic lines. 
In a 2007 report, the Fiji Human Rights Commission drew a link between "the Government's 
condemnation of the Commission's report on Affirmative Action policies and the announcement of 
snap elections".47 Elections were announced in March 2006 and scheduled to be held in May of that 
year, at a time which, in the Commission's view, "Fiji was far from ready for elections".48 The 
Commission pointed out that the last census had been conducted in 199649 and since then there had 
been no review of the boundaries of constituencies to determine whether or not they should be 
changed to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution that allow for representation along ethnic 
lines.50 This is one of the reasons why the validity of the 2006 election was questioned by the 
  
45  Statement of Prime Minister Qarase (30 June 2006) Press Conference available at 
www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/printer_6976.shtml (accessed 1 June 2008). 
46  Ibid. The reference to "what occurred in 1987 and 2000" is a reference to the military coups (or attempted 
coups) of those years. 
47  Shaista Shameem The Assumption of Executive Authority on December 5th 2006 by Commodore J V 
Bainimarama, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces: Legal, Constitutional and Human Rights 
Issues (4 January 2007) available at www.humanrights.org.fj/ [Shameem Report].  
48  Ibid, 7. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Of the 71 seats in Parliament, 23 are reserved for ethnic Fijians, 19 for Indians, 1 for a Rotuman, 3 seats for 
those who are not Fijian, Indian or Rotuman and the rest of the seats, 25 in total, are open for voters from all 
communities. The FHRC stated that "in both 2001 and 2005, election results in Fiji were determined by the 
Open seats": ibid, 8. 
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FHRC,51 and its victors declared by others (such as Commodore Bainamarama, then head of the 
armed forces) to be corrupt.52 
On 5 December 2006, Commadore Bainimarama assumed executive power and dismissed 
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo, Vice-President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and Prime Minister Laisenia 
Qarase. On 4 January 2007 Commodore Bainimarama restored executive authority to President 
Iloilo, who on 5 January 2007 appointed Commodore Bainimarama as interim Prime Minister.  
V THE FIJI HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
EVENTS OF DECEMBER 2006  
By 2007, the Fiji Human Rights Commission was widely perceived by domestic and 
international aid organisations and the foreign media to have compromised its independence by 
giving overt support to what most legal commentators have described as the coup d'état of 
Commodore Bainimarama in December 2006.53 Although both the ICC and the APF commenced 
reviews of the status of the FHRC, the FHRC resigned from APF and withdrew from the ICC before 
these bodies could reach a conclusion on whether the FHRC still complied with the Paris Principles 
requirement of independence from Government.  
Two aspects of the FHRC's conduct in the aftermath of the events of December 2006 caused the 
international community – and in particular the APF and ICC – to question the FHRC's 
independence from the ruling power. The first was the method of appointment of the Acting 
Ombudsman, Rodney Acraman, by the military Government in December 2006. The position of 
Ombudsman had been vacant for over six months while the Constitutional Offices Commission 
deliberated on its appointment recommendation. Following the seizure of power by the military, 
Commadore Bainimarama dismissed the Acting Chairperson of the Constitutional Offices 
  
51  The Assumption of Executive Authority on December 5th 2006 by Commodore J.V. Bainimarama, 
Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces: Legal, Constitutional and Human Rights Issues Part II: 
Report to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on alleged breaches of international law and the 
1997 Constitution of Fiji in the removal of the Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase on December 5th 2006 (29 
August 2007) available at www.humanrights.org.fj (accessed 1 June 2008) [Shameem Report Part II]. 
Dr Shaista Shameem states at p 2: "The [first] Reports also stated that second Qarase Government had failed 
to hold a census to enable constituency boundaries to be constitutionally drawn prior to the 2006 elections. 
The validity of both Qarase Governments, that is, of 2001 and 2006, was therefore questioned." 
52  Chang, above n 4, 21. 
53  "Report Claims Military Abuse" Fiji Times Online (8 March 2007) www.fijitimes.com (accessed 21 August 
2008). A United States State Department report on human rights practices in Fiji has criticised FHRC 
Director Dr Shaista Shameem for failing to publicly object to human rights abuses: Department of State 
Country Practices on Human Rights 2007 (2008) "Fiji" www.state.gov/ (accessed 15 December 2008). The 
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs labelled the Director of the FHRC an apologist for the Fiji military 
regime: Hon Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (1 March 2007) Media Release 
www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2007 (accessed 21 August 2008). 
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Commission, Stuart Huggett.54 Then, in his capacity as Acting President, Commadore Bainimarama 
appointed Mr Acraman as Acting Ombudsman,55 by-passing the constitutional requirement that the 
Ombudsman be appointed by the Constitutional Offices Commission following consultation with 
the Prime Minister.56 Mr Acraman then became, by default, Acting Chairperson of the FHRC. On 
14 December 2007, one of the other two Commissioners of the FHRC, Sevuloni Valenitabua, 
resigned in protest at Mr Acraman's appointment. The other Commissioner, Shamima Ali, retained 
her position.  
The second aspect of concern involved the Commission's January 2007 report (the Shameem 
Report) on the military coup.57 Dr Shameem, who authored the report as Director of the FHRC, 
stated that it was written "in response to the number of requests the Commission has received from 
the public to determine legality issues"58 and was based on:59  
An assessment of the Commander's assumption of executive authority as well as on the apparently 
singular view of both local and international observers and commentators that the Commander of the 
RFMF illegally overthrew the democratically elected and legitimate Government of Fiji on December 5 
2006.  
The Shameem Report received the imprimatur of the Chair of the Commission, Mr Acraman, 
although it appears that it had been written before his term of office began. The Report stated, "the 
Qarase Government was involved in massive violations of human rights in Fiji, constituting crimes 
against humanity, and made serious attempts to impose ethnic cleansing tactics in Fiji."60 It further 
stated that, "the crimes against humanity that were committed in Fiji 2001 – 2006 were condoned 
not only by the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) but also by UN agencies".61  
The Shameem Report's legal analysis of the assumption of power by Commodore Bainimarama 
was that it was justified under the doctrine of necessity; the Commadore "stepped into the 
President's shoes" to remove the Prime Minister and to dissolve Parliament.62 According to the 
  
54  Dr Shameem stated that the reason given for the dismissal of Mr Huggett was that he was placed in a 
situation of conflict of interest in breach of s156 of the Constitution: Shameem Report, above n 47, 20. 
55  Mr Acraman, for sixteen years Secretary to the Ombudsman's office, had been one of the applicants for the 
position of Ombudsman. 
56  The Constitution (Fiji), s 163(1). 
57  Shameem Report, above n 47. See also Shameem Report Part II, above n 51. 
58  Shameem Report, above n 47, 2. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid, 15. 
61  Ibid.  
62  See Republic of the Fiji Islands v Chandrika Prasad [2001] FJCA 2 and cases cited there. 
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Shameem Report, the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) "overthrew an illegally constituted, 
unconstitutional Government which was acting against the public interest in violation of public 
security and public safety protections in the Constitution".63 The Report stated that the RFMF had 
the "capacity to invoke certain human rights and welfare powers under section 94 of the 1990 
Constitution and section 112 of the 1997 Constitution Amendment Act"64 and that:65 
Since it has the constitutional power to ensure security and protect people, the military does not act 
unlawfully as long as it keeps to this objective. In view of the rampant abuse of power, privilege, 
illegalities and wastage of wealth of the Qarase regime, as well as its proposed discriminatory legislation 
which, if enacted, would have constituted a "crime against humanity" under the International Law 
Commission's definition, and limited scope for an immediate judicial solution, there appear to few 
options remaining to protect the people of Fiji from an illegal, unconstitutional, anti-human rights, and 
despotic regime. 
The Shameem Report also contained a "compliance audit" of the effect of the military takeover 
on the Bill of Rights provisions in the 1997 Constitution. The "audit" concluded that "in the 
Commission's assessment of events in the early stages, few of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
provisions were derogated from by the Commander to the extent of Chapter 14 requirements,66 
though concerns were raised in the first week about a number of people being taken to the army 
camp for questioning".67 The Report noted that one person, Kenneth Zinck, "was reported to have 
been treated with an indignity during this early period"68 and that the Editor in Chief of a local 
newspaper was intimidated and physically abused,69 but that the exercise of rights such as freedom 
of movement, personal liberty, freedom of association and privacy, remained generally 
unaffected.70  
  
63  Shameem Report, above n 47, 30. 
64  Ibid, 6. 
65  Ibid, 31. 
66  The Constitution ch 14 contains provisions relating to procedures to be followed during a state of 
emergency. It allows authorities to derogate from certain rights protected by the Bill of Rights, "if Cabinet 
has reasonable grounds for believing that, because of the emergency described in the proclamation of the 
state of emergency, the life of the state is threatened and the exigencies of the situation are such that they 
cannot be dealt with effectively without derogating from the Bill of Rights": Shameem Report, above n 47, 
17. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Ibid, 18. 
70  Ibid. 
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The Shameem Report noted that (some) constraints had been imposed by the military on 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly,71 but also noted that these rights "were limited 
even in normal times by national security, public safety and public order law...."72 The Commission 
itself:73  
Thought it wise, in the interests of public safety, to bluntly remind people of the limitation clauses in the 
Bill of Rights, especially as some of the protestors appeared to the Commission investigators to be 
deliberately antagonizing the military and justifying their acts on the fact that the Constitution was still 
in place. 
The assessment in the Shameem Report of the nature and extent of human rights violations 
committed in the wake of the assumption of military rule is in marked contrast to the assessment 
made by representatives of international NGOs and outside observers. Amnesty International, for 
example, reported "deaths in custody, degrading punishment of government opponents and 
crackdowns on the judiciary and media," with the military responsible for "limiting the judiciary's 
independence and severely undermining media freedom and freedom of expression."74  
A response to the Shameem Report was drafted and circulated in January 2007 by 
Commissioner Shamima Ali "and a group of respected senior lawyers who between them have 
considerable experience and expertise in human rights and constitutional law nationally and 
internationally".75 The response queried the authority of the Shameem Report in light of the fact that 
the Acting Chair of the FHRC had not been legally and constitutionally appointed. It also addressed 
the substance of the report, particularly the report's assertion that the military acted lawfully in 
seizing power in December 2006:76 
It is in the Report's support for the role of the RFMF under the 1990 Constitution that discloses its slant. 
It goes to extraordinary lengths to put a gloss on the military having an expanded brief in normal life. 
The explanation may have a reassuring feel among those who have applauded their recent actions. One 
succumbs to this delusion at his/her peril. This country has had four coups. All have had their genesis in 
the RFMF with some participation from outside elements. It is an armed military commanded by 
  
71  Shameem Report, above n 47, 19. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid. 
74  "Amnesty International: Fiji human rights on downward spiral since military coup" International Herald 
Tribune (29 May 2008) www.iht.com/articles (accessed 16 December 2008). 
75  Shamima Ali A Response to the Fiji Human Rights Commission Director's Report on the Assumption of 
Executive Authority by Commodore J V Bainimarama, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
available at www.dev-zone.org/ (accessed 18 August 2008) [Ali Report]. Shamima Ali's term as 
Commissioner has now expired. 
76  Ibid, 12. 
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officers who arrogate to themselves the role of watchdog, for no other reason than their possession of 
guns that remain a constant threat to our fledgling democracy. 
Commissioner Ali's response concludes:77  
The Report is riddled with legal inaccuracies, misapplications of the law and a selective reading of case 
law. What is disturbing is that it claims to be a dispassionate and balanced analysis of the legalities 
surrounding the RFMF's usurpation of power on 5 December 2006. It is in fact a veiled justification for 
the actions of the RFMF on 6 December 2006. What emerges from the Report is a pathological dislike 
of Prime Minister Qarase and his two governments. The tragedy is that in confusing the latter with its 
apparent approval of the RFMF's perspective in relation to its own actions, the Report has compromised 
the Fiji Human Rights Commission and Shameem's own standing as well as set back the cause of human 
rights generally in Fiji.  
This paper does not aim to resolve the Shameem/Ali debate. Some of Shameem's contentions 
are inflammatory, such as her statement that:78 
Democracy is still very much at an experimental stage internationally, and the Human Rights 
Commission acknowledges that as long as there is representation of all the people in governance, any 
kind of human rights respecting democracy would be acceptable. It is reminded of the fact that Hitler 
won both an election and a plebiscite before 1939, and survived a military putsch. The price of Hitler's 
democracy was 11 million people dead in the death camps.  
Such comments tend to obfuscate the fact that many people in Fiji shared Shameem's view that 
the events of 2006 were a correction to the political situation imposed after the 1987 and 2000 
coups.79 Jon Fraenkel writes that, other than the Director of the Fiji Human Rights Commission:80  
An assortment of Catholic social justice advocates, much of the business community and probably the 
majority of left-leaning civil society activists supported the coup… the reaction from the bulk of the 
  
77  Ali Report, above n 75, 13.  
78  Shameem Report, above n 47, 32.  
79  On 9 October 2008, Acting Chief Justice Gates and Justices Byrne and Pathik of the High Court of Fiji 
found that President Iloilo had acted lawfully following Commander Bainimarama's seizure of power. The 
Court held that "exceptional circumstances existed, not provided for by the Constitution and the stability of 
the State was endangered. We also find that no other course of action was reasonably available, and that 
such action as taken by the President was reasonably necessary in the interests of peace, order and good 
government." Qarase v Bainimarama [2008] FJHC 241 para 162. The Fiji Human Rights Commission acted 
as amicus curiae, although the case turned largely on issues of constitutional law relating to the prerogative 
powers of the President and the doctrine of necessity, and the judgment makes no explicit reference to 
human rights issues.  
80  Jon Fraenkel "The Fiji Coup of December 2006: who, what, where and why?" Addendum in Jon Fraenkel 
and Stewart Firth (eds) From election to coup in Fiji: The 2006 campaign and its aftermath (ANU Epress, 
2007) 420 http://epress.anu.edu.au/ (accessed 8 August 2008).  
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Fijian Indian community was astonishing; the group that had such a strong sense of its own victimhood, 
due to the 1987 and 2000 coups and the much earlier experience of girmitya (indentured labour), was 
strongly in favour of the clean-up coup. 
The dispute between the Director of the FHRC and its remaining legally appointed 
Commissioner brought the FHRC into disrepute and demanded the attention of the APF and the 
ICC. Initially, the Director of the FHRC actively sought counsel and support from the APF. The 
Director made members of the network aware of the irregular process used to appoint Mr Acraman 
and offered to resign or withdraw from the APF and ICC if the membership held the view that this 
was the appropriate course of action for the FHRC to pursue. The APF and ICC commenced 
enquiries into the question of whether the irregularities of Mr Acraman's appointment jeopardised 
the FHRC's compliance with the Paris Principles requirements of independence. The APF 
commenced a formal review of the FHRC on 20 March 2007. On 3 April 2007, the FHRC resigned 
from the APF. On 22 March 2007, the ICC suspended the "A" status of the FHRC pending 
provision of information by FHRC about its independence. Soon after, the FHRC also resigned from 
the ICC.  
The irregularity in appointment of the chairperson and the dispute between the FHRC's Director 
and one of its Commissioners undermined the credibility of the FHRC during a period when the 
human rights of Fiji's citizens were gravely threatened. The narrower issue is whether there were 
structural flaws in the constitutional and legislative provisions relating to appointment of 
Commissioners and Commission staff that opened up space for such a dispute to occur. The broader 
issue concerns the political nature of the FHRC's report and the response to it from the APF and 
ICC.  
VI THE "POLITICISATION" OF THE FHRC? 
The events of December 2006 and the subsequent conduct of the FHRC raise questions about 
the FHRC's independence and operation: how does a human rights commission fulfil its duty to 
discuss the human rights implications of political actions without the appearance of partisanship? Is 
it possible for a NHRI to support government policy or action without losing its real or perceived 
independence? Ought the constitutional and legislative safeguards that aim to ensure the 
appointment of apolitical, bipartisan, representative commissioners be employed in the selection of 
high level commission staff, as well? Is the appointment of "part-time" commissioners, or 
commissioners with other primary obligations, the most effective way of ensuring the integrity of a 
NHRI? This article does not attempt to provide definitive answers to these questions, but rather aims 
to explore some of these issues in the context of the FHRC's experience following the events of 
December 2006. 
The experience of the FHRC illustrates the difficulties a national commission experiences as it 
attempts to carry out its functions in a complex and turbulent socio-political terrain. It would be 
naïve to suggest that a national commission must be apolitical. Its mandate is to monitor the extent 
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to which the population of the state enjoy their human rights. The reports, findings and 
investigations of a national commission will in many instances address political issues of interest to 
the broader community, and their reports and recommendations may have political consequences. 
Governments may adopt the recommendations of a national report or reject them; opposition parties 
may use the national commission's work to gain political advantage or to extract political 
concessions, and NGOs may use the work of the NHRI as leverage to secure undertakings from 
government. Indeed the effectiveness of a NHRI – the degree to which its work influences 
government policy to achieve human rights advances – may depend upon on the degree to which the 
NHRI is perceived as having direct or indirect political influence and impact. A commission that 
fails to address fundamental human rights issues embedded in the pressing political issues of its 
nation is likely to be viewed as an ineffectual commission.  
The Paris Principles state that "a national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as 
possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its 
composition and its sphere of competence."81 Leaving to one side the question of whether the 
Shameem Report was the work of the FHRC or merely of an individual employee acting beyond her 
authority, the report's attempt to portray the seizure of power by the military in 2006 as legal under 
international law has been condemned as an unacceptable foray by a NHRI into the realm of the 
political.82 Condemnation of the particular tenor of the Shameem Report – which supported the 
extra-constitutional removal of an elected government – has distracted commentators from 
reflecting upon the more basic question of whether or not it is the role of a NHRI to express views 
on overtly political matters such as the legitimacy of the imposition of martial law.83   
The Fiji Human Rights Commission Act, laudable in the breadth of its mandate from a Paris 
Principles perspective, empowers the FHRC to inquire generally into any matter, including any 
enactment or law, or any procedure or practice whether governmental or non-governmental, if it 
appears to the Commission that human rights are, or may be, infringed thereby and to investigate 
allegations of contraventions of human rights and allegations of unfair discrimination, of its own 
  
81  Paris Principles, above n 3. 
82  For example "the FHRC has been perceived as losing its independence and credibility over the past 10 
months, especially in light of its controversial legal analyses of the December 5th 2006 military coup in Fiji. 
A controversial report, released in January 2007, justified the coup as a necessity to protect Fiji from 
possible 'crimes against humanity' by the elected government." Press Release (17 October 2007) 
www.fijiwomen.com/index (accessed 21 August 2008). 
83  Commentators have discussed the difficulty NHRIs have in establishing independence from Government 
and the loss of credibility that follows when NHRIs make concessions to Government – see, in particular, 
Anne Smith's discussion of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission: Anne Smith "The Unique 
Position of Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?" (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 904. 
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motion or on complaint by individuals, groups or institutions on their own behalf or on behalf of 
others.84 
The Shameem Report arguably fell within the jurisdiction of the FHRC, and the report seeks to 
ground its arguments in human rights analysis. If the Shameem Report was within the mandate of 
the FHRC, to what extent ought its substance become the subject of review by the APF and ICC? If 
"the practical task of protecting and promoting human rights is primarily a national one, for which 
each state must be responsible"85 and "the most effective education and information campaigns are 
likely to be those which are designed and carried out at the national or local level and which take the 
local cultural and traditional context into account"86 then surely a great deal of discretion must be 
allowed for national commissions to exercise their mandate as they see fit. A human rights 
commission must be able to occasionally endorse the actions of the Government of the day, if in its 
view these actions further people's enjoyment of human rights, without necessarily acquiring the 
label of "puppet" or "lackey".  
In what sense did the FHRC's (the Shameem Report) about Commodore Bainimarama's 
assumption of power indicate that the FHRC was no longer independent? There are a number of 
possible responses to this question. One is that NHRIs are established under a protocol endorsed by 
the UN, which is an institution committed to the promotion of a particular form of western 
democracy. Ipso facto, NHRIs cannot act to undermine or question the legitimacy of democratic 
processes such as periodic elections that are endorsed by the UN. The Shameem Report argues "the 
RFMF overthrew an illegally constituted, unconstitutional Government which was acting against the 
public interest in violation of public security and public safety protections in the Constitution."87 
Outside observers were unable to accept as credible an "independent" interpretation of events so at 
odds with that of most UN observers and international NGOs. The inference that was drawn was 
that the FHRC was acting in support of the ruling power on the basis of an implausible human rights 
analysis, and was hence not independent of the military government in appearance or in substance.  
An alternative response is that the Shameem Report reveals its author's fundamental 
misconception of the role of a NHRI. In the report, Shameem writes, "the Human Rights 
Commission has a constitutional responsibility, as a neutral and impartial broker, to defend human 
rights."88 In the notion of "broker" Shameem touches upon a key component of a commission's role: 
responsibility and accountability to a range of social and political actors. A NHRI is required to 
  
84  Human Rights Commission Act 1999, s 7. 
85  Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Factsheet No. 19 National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (accessed 21 August 2008). 
86  Ibid. 
87  Shameem Report, above n 47, 31. 
88  Ibid, 27. 
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engage with the executive, with legislators, with the judiciary, with civil society and NGOs, with the 
media, and with members of the international community. In carrying out its role of protecting and 
promoting human rights, it cannot succumb to pressure from any one of these groups. Its aim must 
be to engage with each group in an open and approachable manner and to promote dialogue between 
these groups on human rights subjects.  
A NHRI will only be able to achieve this if there is a perception by these groups (as well as the 
reality), that it is driven solely by its mandate to improve the standard of human rights enjoyed by 
the community. Particularly in situations of extreme political sensitivity, such as after a military 
takeover, the legitimacy of a NHRI will depend on whether it stands as a credible commentator on 
violations of human rights that may be occurring. Its credibility will be undermined if the institution 
publicly endorses a particular political party, movement or action.  
The FHRC Director's singular response to the events of 5 December 2006 was so weighted 
toward vindication of the actions of Commadore Bainimarama that it excluded the FHRC's future 
engagement on the subject with what the Paris Principles refer to as the pluralist representation of 
the social forces of civilian society – NGOs, trade unions, concerned social and professional 
organisations and academics, who may not have agreed with the Shameem Report's interpretation of 
events.  
Regardless of whether the substance of the Shameem Report was correct, its existence 
compromised the FHRC's ability to fulfil its mandate to engage with all aspects of Fijian society. A 
requirement of pluralism means more than ensuring an appointment representative of various 
genders, races and religions; it means a commission comprised of members with the ability to 
understand and respond to the needs and interests of all aspects of society. 
The willingness of a NHRI to criticise the Government has been described as the "litmus test" of 
its independence.89 The experience of the FHRC suggests that independence is more than this; not 
only must a national institution for the protection and promotion of human rights resist yielding to 
pressure from any one sector of society, but it must maintain the appearance of impartiality so that it 
can continue to engage with different parts of society. This will inevitably mean that national 
institutions will have to withdraw from, or address in sensitive and muted tones, some issues that are 
highly politicised. The judgments involved here are sensitive but essential to the NHRI maintaining 
its accountability to Government, to civil society and to the public. 
VII PROCESSES FOR THE SELECTION OF COMMISSIONERS 
The manner in which the FHRC became politicised and lost the appearance of independence in 
relation to the military Government gives rise to questions about whether there were other ways in 
which this may have been prevented. One area is in relation to the appointment of commission staff. 
  
89  Smith, above n 82, 936. 
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While the Paris Principles address the issue of pluralism generally and in the composition of a 
NHRI itself, a similar argument might be made in relation to the (senior) staff of a commission. 
Another issue is whether there needs to be a number of full-time commissioners in order to ensure 
the effective functioning of a commission and compliance with the Paris Principles. 
In the case of Fiji, the constitutional provisions aim to ensure that the people, through 
Parliament and the President, are represented by Commissioners who are able to recognise and 
respond to their needs. It could be argued that if a Commission's Chairperson has another primary 
role (for example the role of Ombudsman) and other Commissioners are part-time appointments, 
then it is inevitable that much of the direction of a Commission will be determined by its Director or 
senior executive officers. Unlike Commissioners, senior staff of the Commission do not have fixed 
terms and are not directly accountable to legislative or executive representatives. It may be the case 
that a Human Rights Commission requires a dedicated full-time Commissioner or Commissioners 
and that the "control and direction" provisions of the Human Right Commission Act need to be 
articulated in greater detail. Of course in the case of Fiji, these tensions were exacerbated by the fact 
that the position of Chair of the Commission had been vacant for six months or more.  
The question of whether Commissioner appointments should be full-time or part-time has been 
raised in the context of other human rights commissions in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asian 
NGOs Network on National Institutions (ANNI) publishes a yearly report on NHRIs in the region. 
In 2008, the ANNI report in relation to the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM 
noted, "public confidence has been further eroded because most Commissioners do not work full-
time for Komnas HAM. Some attend only the plenary sessions... they consider their contributions as 
merely a 'side job.'"90 The ANNI report in relation to Malaysia noted that:91 
Eighteen commissioners are serving out the 2006 – 2008 term. Most are either former civil servants or 
those who have worked closely with the government. Despite being paid a handsome salary and 
allowances, the commissioners continue to serve on a part-time basis and are not exclusively focussed 
on human rights work. 
It may be the case that full-time commissioners, whose sole responsibility is to fulfil the national 
institution's legislative or constitutional mandate, would ensure a more effective and reliably 
functioning national commission. At its October 2007 session, the International Coordinating 
Committee's Sub-Committee on Accreditation (the "Accreditation Sub-Committee") announced in 
  
90  The Asian NGOs Network on National Institutions 2008 Report on the Performance and Establishment of 
National Human Rights Institutions in Asia (Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Bangkok, 
2008) 77. 
91  Ibid, 97. 
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one of its General Observations that members of NHRIs should include full-time remunerated 
members in order to:92 
a) Ensure the independence of the NHRI free from actual or perceived conflict of interests;  
b) Ensure a stable mandate for the members; and 
c) Ensure the ongoing and effective fulfilment of the mandate of the NHRI. 
It is possible that a laudable desire to meet Paris Principles requirements of pluralism has 
motivated some states to create commissions with a number of part-time commissioners. However, 
the Paris Principles pluralism requirements do not necessarily demand a representative selection of 
commissioners, merely that there be a procedure for selection of members that affords "all necessary 
guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in 
the promotion and protection of human rights".93 It is possible that a selection committee for 
commissioners that was representative of different aspects of society, gender, age, religion, 
academe, and civil society could approve a selection that met the Paris Principles' requirements of 
pluralism.  
The Accreditation Sub-Committee has recognised that "there are diverse models of ensuring the 
requirement of pluralism set out in the Paris Principles".94 The Accreditation Sub-Committee 
provided several examples of the different ways in which pluralism may be achieved through the 
composition of the national institution, for example:95 
a) Members of the governing body represent different segments of society as referred to in the Paris 
Principles; 
b) Pluralism through the appointment procedures of the governing body of the National Institution, for 
example, where diverse societal groups suggest or recommend candidates; 
c) Pluralism through procedures enabling effective co-operation with diverse societal groups, for 
example advisory committees, networks, consultations or public forums; or 
d) Pluralism through diverse staff representing the different societal groups within the society. 
  
92  General Observations developed by the Sub-Committee of the International Coordinating Committee of 
National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights [Accreditation Sub-Committee] 
(October 2007) http://nhri.net/ (accessed 21 August 2008). 
93  Paris Principles, above n 3. 
94  General Observations developed by the Accreditation Sub-Committee (October 2006) http://nhri.net/2008/ 
(accessed 21 August 2008). 
95  Ibid. 
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The Paris Principles are broad enough to encompass a wide range of ingenuous approaches to 
satisfying requirements of pluralism and independence of composition. Pacific island nations 
seeking to establish NHRIs may be able to fashion creative appointment processes that reflect 
cultural particularities and the diverse components of Pacific society. The Thai Human Rights 
Commission, for example, consists of members appointed by the King, who have been elected by 
the Senate from a list of nominees drawn up by a selection committee. The selection committee 
consists of the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
the Prosecutor-General, the Chairman of the Law Council, rectors and representatives from 
institutions of higher education and representatives of private organisations in the field of human 
rights.96 
VIII THE FHRC AND PARIS PRINCIPLES DEMANDS OF ADEQUATE 
RESOURCING  
Given that the FHRC has resource limits (a situation likely to be faced more acutely by other 
Pacific Island nations), the question of the extent to which a NHRI should draw on external funds 
from public or private donors instead of or to supplement Government funding is important. Not 
only should Governments be seen to, and actually, invest in their NHRI, but too great a reliance on 
external funding may undermine both the appearance and fact of independence for a NHRI. This 
issue has arisen in the context of commissions in countries emerging from conflict situations; it 
gives rise to complex issues and a simple or uniform answer may not be available.97  
While the Paris Principles make clear that financial autonomy is the basis of an independent 
NHRI, they are silent on the source of its funding. The Paris Principles state:98  
The national institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its 
activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its 
own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the government and not be subject to financial 
control which might affect this independence.  
  
96  National Human Rights Commission Act 1999, ss 5 and 8. The Thai National Human Rights Commission, 
like that of Fiji, struggled to maintain independence after the military coup of September 2006. The 
President at the time, Professor Saneh Charmarik, commented to the local media the day after the coup that 
"I do not think it is about progression or regression [of democracy] but about problem solving." 
Nonetheless, the majority of the eleven full-time Commissioners of the Thai NHRC took steps to stress their 
independence and maintained that they remained vigilant against abuses of human rights by the military 
junta. Professor Charmarik "cited these varying responses to the coup as proof that the NHRC remains 
independent to either agree or disagree with the junta": Asian NGOs Network on National Institutions 2008 
Report on the Performance and Establishment of National Human Rights Institutions in Asia (Asian Forum 
for Human Rights and Development, Thailand, 2008) 190. 
97  See for example the discussion in relation to Palestine in Byrnes, Durbach, and Renshaw, above n 6. 
98  Paris Principles, above n 3. 
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The Accreditation Sub-Committee has elaborated on the funding requirements for NHRIs in one 
of its General Observations. In April 2008, the Sub-Committee noted that the provision of adequate 
funding by the state should, as a minimum include:99  
a) The allocation of funds for adequate accommodation, at least its head office;  
b) Salaries and benefits awarded to its staff comparable to public service salaries and conditions;  
c) Remuneration of Commissioners (where appropriate); and  
d) The establishment of communications systems including telephone and internet. 
The Accreditation Sub-Committee also stated that adequate funding should, to a reasonable 
degree, ensure the gradual and progressive realisation of the improvement of the organisation's 
operations and the fulfilment of their mandate.100 The Accreditation Sub-Committee stated that 
funding from "external sources, such as from development partners, should not compose the core 
funding of the NHRI as it is the responsibility of the state to ensure the NHRI's minimum activity 
budget in order to allow it to operate towards fulfilling its mandate".101 The APF Council has 
adopted an arguably more nuanced approach to the issue of funding, particularly in the case of 
countries emerging from conflict situations. The Council has considered it significant that NHRIs in 
countries such as Afghanistan and Palestine request donors to contribute funds to support activities 
set out in the institution's strategic plans, as opposed to the donors suggesting activities for 
funding.102 
While securing adequate funding from Government sources for a NHRI may prove challenging 
for Pacific nations, the experience of Fiji suggests that it may an important factor in securing long 
term domestic legitimacy. In 2007, the Fiji Human Rights Commission decided not to accept aid 
from Australia, New Zealand and the European Union.103 This decision followed criticism by 
Australia and New Zealand of the actions of the FHRC in the wake of the events of December 2006. 
In a media release published on the website of the FHRC on 12 November 2007, Dr Shameem 
stated her opinion about the provision of aid: "keep your money, we do not want a slush fund and 
we want to retain our independence".104 Dr Shameem stated that "I have been uncomfortable about 
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the NZAID, AusAID and EU power play in the Pacific for some time and we are thankful we need 
not put up with it any longer".105 
The comments of Dr Shameem, now the Chairperson of the FHRC,106 embody sentiments that 
to different degrees resonate across the Pacific. A possible alternative to direct financial aid for 
NHRIs is practical assistance from countries in the region with established NHRIs. This assistance 
could take the form of the provision of technical expertise, staff training and other capacity-building 
measures. In this regard, the work of the APF in supporting the establishment of NHRIs in the Asia 
Pacific region must be noted. As a membership-based organisation, the APF is able to distill the best 
practices and operational strengths of its members and use them to assist the establishment or 
development of nascent NHRIs. As a regional organisation, the majority of APF's seventeen 
members share an ex-colonial past and are sensitive to issues of perceived neo-colonial domination 
in the guise of the implementation of international human rights. Practical assistance from a 
membership organisation is likely to be far less offensive to the sensibilities of Pacific nations than 
other forms of financial assistance. The APF does not employ the concept of "aid" which so caused 
Dr Shameem to bridle, but creates processes where members share information and resources, 
develop co-operative partnerships and establish "best practice" standards.  
The support of a regional network of NHRIs will be critically important to the national 
institutions of Pacific nations in less tangible respects as well. It is likely that many of the 
institutions created in the Pacific would be small, possibly staffed by only one commissioner. It is 
possible that the institution would be physically dependent on government resources to conduct its 
work. In such circumstances, members of the human rights institutions would need a robust sense of 
their own independence from government. Membership of a regional organisation of NHRIs such as 
APF would assist institution members in identifying with the international human rights community 
and the norms that it seeks to uphold.  
In 2007 the New Zealand Human Rights Commission and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
published a study National Human Rights Institutions: Pathways for Pacific States.107  The study 
makes a number of practical suggestions for Pacific nations who may wish to establish a NHRI. 
These include adopting a "building blocks approach" to the growth of NHRIs: for example, 
"integrating development into existing planning and budget processes and anticipating short, 
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medium and long-term development",108 "nesting" an NHRI within an existing institution,109 and 
developing a designated human rights capacity such as a "human rights desk".110  
These suggestions retain the State's position as principal provider of funding for national 
institutions. One of the strengths of a national institution for the promotion and protection of rights, 
compared to regional or international machinery, is that a national institution is "owned" by the state 
and its people. It is the peoples' own institution, staffed by nationals with a deep knowledge of the 
nation, standing watch for the people. For these reasons, while most human rights commissions lack 
the power to "force" Governments to change policies or amend legislation, nonetheless the 
recommendations, reports and findings of a NHRI cannot easily be dismissed by governments. The 
fact that the rights institution is indigenous is a powerful tool for positive coercion of Governments. 
This tool may be weakened if a NHRI's principal funding is from external sources. 
IX CONCLUSION 
As a growing number of Pacific Island nations111 indicate their intention to establish NHRIs,112 
it is timely to reflect upon the experience of the FHRC. Fiji remains the only Pacific island nation to 
have created a commission for the promotion and protection of human rights. Fiji has economic 
resources to support the infrastructure of an independent commission. Its size also means that it has 
a reasonable pool of talent from which to draw commissioners and staff. Factors other than 
inadequate economic and human resources led to the demise of the FHRC's reputation as an 
independent and effective national human rights commission. 
The experience of Fiji has shown that regional networks such as the APF and international 
bodies such as the ICC are prepared to hold NHRIs accountable to preserve the integrity of the Paris 
Principles. It also shows that the Paris Principles requirements of pluralism and independence, and 
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the relationship that exists between these two concepts, are still largely untested. In aiming to 
achieving pluralism and independence in practice, NHRIs will be aided by engagement with similar 
institutions in other states. The experiences of other national human rights commissions will be 
invaluable aids for nascent NHRIs in the Pacific. Engagement should take place not only at the level 
of commissioner, but also amongst senior executives, such as directors, managers and chief 
operating officers, within institutions. Networks such as APF enhance the technical abilities and 
management capacities of NHRIs, but also serve to reinforce the idea that members and officers of 
NHRIs are responsible to a regional and international constituency as well as to a domestic one.  
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